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Abstract 
The rarity with which firms reduce nominal wages has been frequently observed, even in the face of 
considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European 
countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a 
range of potential reasons for why they avoid cutting wages. Concerns about the retention of 
productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward 
wage rigidity across all countries and firm types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were 
found to be an important consideration for firms in euro area countries but were one of the lowest 
ranked obstacles in non-euro area countries. The paper examines how firm characteristics and 
collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put 
forward for the infrequency of wage cuts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The difficulty inherent in reducing nominal wages has recently moved into the 
spotlight as a result of efforts of a number of European countries, especially within 
the EURO area, to adjust to serious economic shocks through internal devaluation. 
Even with the severity of the economic downturn experienced across Europe in recent 
years, cuts in nominal wages appear to be a last resort for firms, and a series of papers 
have established that wages tend to be sticky downwards.1 Evidence from interviews 
with business owners and firm managers have even suggested that selective layoffs 
are usually preferred to across-the-board wage reductions (Bewley, 1999). Bertola et 
al. (2012), using data from the same survey of European firms that this paper will 
analyse, found that only two percent of firms would use base wage cuts as the main 
channel of labour cost reduction if faced with a significant cost shock. A considerably 
higher percentage reported that they would rely on reducing staff numbers or hours 
worked as their main strategy.2 
 
So why is it so difficult to cut nominal wages? This paper uses evidence from a firm 
survey conducted in a number of EU countries to investigate a range of different 
theories as to why firms appear reluctant to lower wages. The sample covers 14,975 
firms from 14 European countries, representing around 47.3 million employees. 
Although the data collection predates the onset of the European crisis, the survey 
provides unique and valuable information on the extent of wage rigidity and enables 
us to evaluate the importance of different explanations for avoiding wage cuts. 
 
An advantage that this study has over previous work in this area is that it lets us use 
cross-country data gathered as part of a harmonised survey designed specifically to 
examine wage setting practices across firms. Previous work in this area has generally 
been restricted to the analysis of single countries using relatively small samples that 
often focused on very large firms. Given the large institutional heterogeneity of 
European labour markets, this unified survey for European countries allows us to 
                                                 
1 See for example, Kahn, 1997; Altonji and Devereux, 2000; and Lebow and Saks, 2003 for evidence 
on the US, and Dickens et al., 2007, 2008 and Babecký et al. (2010) for Europe. 
2 17.5% said they would reduce numbers of temporary employees, 11% would reduce numbers of 
permanent employees and 7% would reduce hours.  Regarding wages, 9.4% said they would reduce 
some flexible components of wages such as bonuses. The use of changes in these flexible components 
of wages is also analysed in Babecký et al. (2012).  
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incorporate the effects of different labour market institutions and policies into our 
understanding of how the main reasons for avoiding wage reductions can vary across 
countries.  
 
The list of possible reasons for avoiding wage cuts that firms were asked to assess in 
the survey was drawn from the extensive literature on wage negotiations and 
flexibility. In particular, the categorisation used by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) was 
used as part of the basis for the selection of questions put to the firms. These theories 
will be discussed in the next section, but in short, firms were asked about the 
influence of labour regulations and collective agreements, the existence of implicit 
contracts, efficiency wage explanations in terms of negative effects on worker morale 
or effort, whether they had concerns about losing key staff or having difficulties in 
future recruitment, whether the costs of future recruitment and training would be 
higher, and whether they felt employees would be concerned with how their wage 
compared to that of similar workers in other firms. 
 
In line with previous research, we find that very few firms – in total approximately 
two percent – report having cut wages, although there are differences across countries 
in how common wage cuts are, particularly between the euro area and non-euro area 
countries. The most relevant reasons given for avoiding base wage cuts are concerns 
about worker morale and the danger that the most productive workers would leave. In 
contrast to previous findings from the USA, a third prominent reason preventing 
nominal wage cuts is institutional restrictions; this reason also showed the greatest 
variation across countries, which can be linked to the institutional factors specific to 
each country such as the prevalence and type of collective bargaining.  
In relation to firm characteristics, we find that firms employing a higher proportion of 
blue-collar and low-skilled white-collar workers rank labour regulation as an 
important inhibitor of wage cuts. Firms with a high percentage of temporary 
employees seem more likely to rank reputation as an employer, concerns that the best 
employees might leave and difficulty in hiring new workers as important reasons. Our 
results imply that worker characteristics are not related to the relevance of reduced 
effort and morale. Larger firms are less likely to assign high relevance to the existence 
of implicit contracts as a rationale for avoiding wage cuts.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the different 
possible explanations for why firms might be reluctant to cut nominal wages and 
briefly reviews the results of existing studies. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents summary statistics on the frequency of wage cuts and the raw ranking of the 
different explanations. Section 4 presents multivariate analyses relating the rationales 
to firm and institutional characteristics and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Reasons for Avoiding Wage Cuts: Literature Overview 
 
Many explanations for the lack of downward flexibility in wages have been put 
forward in the literature. Efficiency wage models rest on the assumption that the effort 
of workers may be stimulated by high or fair wages (see Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990; and Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The turnover model assumes that 
persistently high wages might increase profitability by reducing the quit rate and 
hence lowering expenditure on hiring and training (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980, and 
Stiglitz, 1974). Higher wages may also raise the quality of the firm’s applicant pool 
(Weiss, 1980). Insider-outsider theories also generate real wage rigidity, especially 
among core workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).  
 
Since workers’ individual characteristics such as age or tenure, education, job type or 
wage level, on-the-job experience, replacement costs, ability to find a job and 
monitoring cost, may imply different worker productivity, these theories also predict 
that wage rigidity may vary across worker characteristics: blue-collar and white-collar 
workers, workers of different ages, or those earning different wage levels. Using a 
limited sample of countries, Du Caju et al. (2012a, 2012b) and Messina et al. (2010) 
have exploited differences in workforce composition to test labour market theories 
indirectly using administrative data. They find support for efficiency wage theories 
and for a clear impact of wage bargaining institutions in shaping different forms of 
downward wage rigidity. 
 
Like Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Franz and 
Pfeiffer (2006) and Rõõm and Uusküla (2009), we follow another route to assess the 
relevance of alternative theories of wage rigidity, which consists of asking firms 
directly why they do not cut wages. The questions posed to the firms in our survey 
were based to a large extent on the classification of these reasons by Campbell and 
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Kamlani (1997) and extended to include the relevance of labour regulation and 
collective bargaining. In addition, we collect information on the workforce and other 
firm characteristics. 
 
In this section, we discuss the options that firms were asked to evaluate and explain 
the motivation behind each of the potential reasons in the context of existing theories 
of downward wage rigidity. Firm managers were asked to assess the relevance of the 
following eight reasons in preventing base wage cuts: 
 
1. Labour regulation or collective agreements prevent wages from being cut; 
2. It would reduce employees’ effort or have a negative impact on employees’ 
morale, resulting in lower output or poorer service3; 
3. It would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer, making it more difficult 
to hire workers in the future; 
4. Following a wage cut, the most productive employees might leave the firm; 
5. It would increase the number of employees leaving, raising the cost of hiring 
and training new workers; 
6. It would create difficulties in attracting new workers; 
7. Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income. Therefore workers and 
firms reach an implicit understanding that wages will neither fall in recessions 
nor rise in expansions; 
8. Workers compare their wages to those of similarly qualified workers in other 
firms in the same market. 
 
Regulation/Explicit Contracts (Reason 1) 
 
The first potential source of downward rigidity in the labour market is the existence of 
explicit contracts, either stemming from individual negotiations with the workers 
themselves through multi-year contracts, or from collective bargaining agreements. 
Information on the extent of unionisation and different types of collective bargaining 
(e.g. firm level, sectoral or national) is also collected in the survey, and we will 
examine the extent to which such differences explain the relevance of this option 
                                                 
3 The reasons referring to reduced effort and reduced moral were asked as different options in the 
questionnaire. However they are conceptually very similar and are both facets of the shirking model so 
in the analysis that follows these two options are grouped into one.   
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across firms and countries. 
 
Efficiency wage theories (Reasons 2,3,4,5,6) 
 
The second, and probably the most detailed, set of explanations for downward wage 
rigidity can be found in the efficiency wage literature, which presents a number of 
behavioural explanations for why firms avoid cutting wages. These models are based 
on the assumption that wages directly affect worker productivity so that reducing the 
wage would have a negative impact on employees’ effort, resulting in lower output 
for the firm. Further explanations within the efficiency wage literature relate to how 
the firm’s actions in cutting wages could impact on its staff composition and future 
recruitment. A reduction in wages could give existing staff an incentive to leave the 
firm, and the quitters are likely to be the most productive workers who would have the 
best outside options (the adverse selection model, Weiss 1980, 1990). This would 
imply that the firm might have to spend more on future recruitment and also that its 
reputation as an employer could be damaged, making it difficult to attract high quality 
staff. This could have a further knock-on effect on the costs of training.  
 
The validity of different theories for explaining wage rigidity has been analysed using 
surveys based on interviews with company managers. According to existing surveys, 
mostly based on the USA and later extended to Sweden, the main reason for avoiding 
nominal wage cuts is that reducing pay has a negative effect on labour productivity 
(Campbell and Kamlani, 1997, Bewley, 1995, 1999, 2004, Agell and Lundborg, 
2003). Some of these surveys also indicated that if there is a need to reduce the labour 
cost in a given firm, company managers prefer laying some people off to lowering the 
wage level. This is because layoffs can be carried out selectively, whereas when all 
workers’ wages are cut, the most productive employees are the most likely to leave 
and the least productive the most likely to remain.  
 
It has been found from several studies that employee morale depends to a large extent 
on whether workers consider payment to them to be fair (Bewley, 1999; Campbell 
and Kamlani, 1997). In wage-related decisions, employees pay more attention to 
internal fairness than to comparison of general wage levels, meaning that compliance 
with the principle of fairness is especially important when decisions are made about 
5
  
cutting wages. Bewley (1999) has indicated that cutting wages has a much more 
negative effect on employee morale if it seems ungrounded because the company is in 
good shape. There are less serious negative consequences from cutting wages when it 
is possible to present wage cuts to the employees as an unavoidable decision. This 
means that when unemployment is high and workers’ outside options are limited, 
firms could cut wages as this would not be considered an unfair wage policy. While 
Levine (1993) reported that changes in unemployment had little effect on the 
managers’ wage setting decisions, Agell and Lundborg (1995) reported that managers 
believe that the business cycle has an impact on employee effort. As we shall see later 
on, wage cuts remain extremely rare for a very large number of firms from different 
countries, which are arguably going to be affected by a wide variety of external 
shocks. 
  
Analysis based on behavioural experiments also confirms the importance of fairness 
considerations in wage-related decisions. Lab and field experiments show that higher 
wages lead to an increase in effort. Interestingly, it is shown that the response to a 
wage cut, which is considered an unfair act, is stronger than the response to a wage 
increase of the same size, which is seen as a fair act (see Fehr et. al 2008). The 
analysis also shows that the impact of fairness considerations on performance is 
higher in long-term employment relationships. 
 
Insider-Outsider (Reasons 5, 6) 
 
The effect of wage cuts on employee turnover and composition (indicated in the 
efficiency wage discussion) has also been framed in a different way in the insider-
outsider theory. In this theory, it is not in the firm’s interest to fire existing workers in 
order to hire others at a lower wage. This is partly due to the associated costs of 
recruitment and training, as in the efficiency wage theory, but this theory adds a 
further dimension by suggesting that retained original workers in this scenario would 
withhold their cooperation from the new recruits and hold up the production process 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). It follows that internal workers are relatively insulated 
from outside labour market conditions, and hence can exert pressure on the firm to 
avoid nominal wage cuts even when the labour market is slack.  
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Implicit Contracts (Reason 7) 
 
Another source of rigidity may be the existence of implicit contracts between the firm 
and workers. The implicit contracts framework assumes that workers are more risk 
averse than firms and the two groups will therefore negotiate a type of insurance 
arrangement whereby the workers’ real wages will be kept relatively stable even if the 
firm faces ups and downs in its performance (Azariadis, 1975). The firm gains if this 
stable wage can be kept below what the average wage would be over the business 
cycle and the worker benefits by not having to deal with unpredictable changes in 
income. 
 
External relative wages – Fair wages (Reason 8) 
 
The final explanation for wage rigidity is that employees are concerned with how 
their wage compares to that of similar workers in other firms in the same market, and 
that their effort levels will be based on a comparison with what they believe to be a 
‘fair wage’ for their job level.  
 
Whether employers take the external wage level into account depends to a large 
extent on the availability of information about the wages in that sector or region. 
Generally, it has been found that the greater the power of trade unions, the more 
knowledgeable the employees are about the external wage structure and the more the 
employers must take it into account in the wage setting process (Agell and Lundborg, 
2003).  
 
 
3. Survey Design and a First Look at the Data 
 
3.1 Survey Description 
 
The analysis in the current paper is based on a survey of firms that was conducted 
between the second half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 in 16 European Union 
countries, 14 of which included the questions analysed here on the reasons for 
avoiding wage cuts. The 14 countries were Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
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Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain.4 The survey was carried out by the national central bank of each 
country and all countries based the survey on a harmonised questionnaire, which was 
developed in the context of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network, a research 
network analysing wage and labour cost dynamics. The harmonised questionnaire 
contained a core set of questions on the firms’ wage setting strategies, which was 
included in all the countries’ questionnaires. The harmonised questionnaire was 
further adapted by some countries to account for specific country characteristics and 
differences in the institutional frameworks. As a result, some countries opted for 
shorter versions of this questionnaire, while others extended it in several dimensions.  
 
The sample frame in each country was based on firms with at least five employees. 
The sectors covered are manufacturing, energy, construction, market services, non-
market services, trade and financial intermediation.5 The sample covers 14,975 firms 
representing around 47.3 million employees.6 In order to make the results 
representative of the total population, the cross-country statistics presented in the 
following sections use employment adjusted weights. For each firm or observation 
these weights indicate the number of employees each observation represents in the 
population.7 These weights are calculated as employment in the population divided by 
the number of firms (in each stratum), in the final sample.8 A detailed description of 
the distribution of the sample by country, sector and size along with a description of 
the construction of employment based weights can be found in the online appendix to 
Babecký et al (2012).  
3.2 Institutional background of participating countries 
                                                 
4 The survey was conducted either by traditional mail, phone and face to face interviews or over the 
internet. The survey was addressed to the company’s CEO or senior-level human resources manager(s). 
Germany and Greece also conducted the survey, but with different questions on wage cuts and so they 
are not included in this paper. 
5 There are however some differences in the sectoral coverage of individual countries – see the online 
appendix to Babecky et al. (2012) for full details. 
6 The response rate varied across countries ranging from 12% in Lithuania to 73% in Poland (for more 
details see Appendix 1 in Babecky et al. 2009). On average, the response rates are comparable to those 
of similar surveys like Campbell and Kamlani, (1997); Agell and Lundborg, (2003); or Franz and 
Pfeiffer, (2006). 
7 The employment adjusted weights account for the unequal probabilities of firms receiving and 
responding to the questionnaire across strata and also for the average firm size (measured as the 
number of employees) in the population in each stratum.  
8 For most of the cases the stratification is based on sector and firm size, while some countries also 
used region as an additional stratum. 
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As discussed in detail in Du Caju et al. (2009), the euro area member states in our 
sample belong to a group of countries with a relatively strictly regulated system of 
wage bargaining, characterised by the existence of extension procedures and a high 
level of collective agreement coverage, and a dominance of sectoral (and to a lesser 
extent firm-level) collective agreements. The non-euro area countries in the sample 
belong to the group of countries where the wage bargaining system is relatively 
deregulated. This group includes countries with very low trade union densities, low 
levels of collective agreement coverage, and decentralised wage bargaining 
frameworks. We will differentiate between the euro area and non-euro area countries 
throughout the paper.9 
 
Table 1: Collective bargaining institutions across countries 
 
Country 
Covered 
employees 
(%) 
Firms subject 
to union 
agreements 
(any level, %) 
Firms having 
firm-level 
agreements (%) 
Firms subject to 
higher level 
agreements (%) 
Austria 95 (H) 98 23 (N) 96 
Belgium 89 (H) 99 35 (N) 98 
Czech Republic 50 (M) 54 51 (D) 18 
Estonia 9 (L) 12 10 (D) 3 
Spain 97 (H) 100 17 (N) 83 
France 67 (M) 100 59 (D) 99 
Hungary 18 (L) 19 19 (D) 0 
Ireland 42 (L) 72 31 (N) 68 
Italy 97 (H) 100 43 (N) 100 
Lithuania 16 (VL) 24 24 (D) 1 
Netherlands 68 (H) 76 30 (N) 45 
Poland 19 (VL) 23 21 (D) 5 
Portugal 56 (VL) 62 10 (N) 59 
Slovenia N/A (H) 100 26 (N) 74 
Total 67    76 33     65 
Euro area 84    94 36     87 
Non-euro area 24     28 26     6 
Note: Responses are weighted, using employment in each cell as weights. Total and euro area country 
aggregates exclude Germany. The information in brackets comes from Du Caju et al. (2009): union 
coverage: VL = very low (0 to 25% of workers are covered by collective agreements), L = low (26 to 
50%), M = moderate (51 to 75%), H = high (76 to 100%); Firm-level agreements: D = when collective 
bargaining takes place, most agreements take place at the firm level, N = company level is not 
dominant in the country. 
 
                                                 
9 The euro area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Slovenia. The non-euro area is: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. The 
group of euro area countries does not include Estonia as it was not a member of the euro area at the 
time the survey was conducted. 
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The survey included three questions related to the collective bargaining of wages. 
Managers were asked if a collective wage agreement applies and if so, whether it is a 
firm-level agreement or a binding agreement that was negotiated at a level outside the 
firm such as the national or sectoral level. In addition, the survey obtained data on the 
proportion of workers in the firm covered by any kind of collective wage agreement, 
internal or external. The information is summarised in Table 1 and is compared with 
the information reported by Du Caju et al. (2009) on collective bargaining coverage 
based on the institutional design of each country. Both data sources are qualitatively 
consistent and point to the sharp contrast between the euro area and non-euro area 
countries highlighted before. In Austria Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Slovenia, 
the coverage of collective agreements is almost universal within the sectors included 
in the survey. 
 
Differences across countries in the share of firms covered by firm-level or higher-
level agreements are substantial. In all countries there is a non-negligible number of 
firms that negotiates wages with local unions at the firm level, affecting a share of the 
workforce that ranges from 59% in France to 10% in Estonia and Portugal. In France, 
however, all firms are subject to collective agreements signed at the sectoral or 
national level, regardless of whether a firm-level agreement exists or not. In Estonia 
in contrast, most firms that sign firm-level agreements with unions are not subject to 
national or sectoral negotiations. Different elements of wage determination and 
employment relationships may be covered in the context of firm-level agreements in 
different countries. The richness of our survey will allow us to examine these 
institutional differences in detail, and assess their influence on the rationale for not 
cutting wages.  
 
3.3 Incidence of Wage Cuts 
 
The survey provides quantitative information on the proportion of firms that have cut 
wages and also on the proportions of workers affected by wage cuts in these firms. 
Specifically, firms were asked if they had ever cut wages during the past five years. If 
they responded “yes” to this question, they were further asked what percentage of 
their workforce this cut had applied to. Firms were instructed to answer the wage-
10
  
setting questions with reference to their main occupational group, which was defined 
earlier in the survey. 
 
 
Table 2: Incidence of wage cuts across countries 
 
Country 
Percentage 
of firms 
having cut 
wages 
Percentage of 
employees 
affected (in the 
sample) 
Percentage of 
employees affected 
(in firms that had 
cut wages) 
Austria  2.99 0.36 12.2 
Belgium  3.1 0.23 7.4 
Czech Rep. 8.37 1.55 18.6 
Estonia  3.05 0.21 6.9 
Spain  0.06 0.01 20.4 
France  2.46 1.1 44.8 
Hungary  2.64 0.27 10.3 
Ireland  1 0.37 37.1 
Italy  0.71 0.15 21.9 
Lithuania  8.33 0.93 11.1 
Netherlands  1.43 0.19 13.2 
Poland  4.38 2.83 64.6 
Portugal  1.01 0.16 16.2 
Slovenia  2.45 1.19 48.6 
All countries 2.37 0.83 34.8 
Euro area 1.31 0.33 25.6 
Non-Euro area  5.1 2.09 40.9 
   Note: Responses are weighted, using employment in each cell as weights. 
 
Table 2 shows that wage cuts are extremely rare. Around 2.4% of the firms had cut 
wages over the last five years and this strategy affected only 0.8% of the workers in 
the sample, and 34.8% of the workers working in firms that had cut wages. 
Interestingly despite the low number of wage cuts there are some apparent differences 
between euro area and non-euro area countries. The percentage of firms that have cut 
wages is close to four times as high in non-euro area countries as in the euro area and 
the percentage of employees affected is also quite considerably higher. The rarity of 
wage cuts has been much commented on across a range of individual country studies. 
For example, Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Agell and Bennmarker (2007) report 
that even during the relatively severe Swedish recession of the 1990s firms did not 
extensively cut wages. In the US, Bewley (1998) notes resistance to pay cuts comes 
11
  
primarily from the employers, with this attitude apparently driven mainly by 
anticipation of negative employee reactions.  
 
3.4 Reasons for Avoiding Wage Cuts 
 
As discussed above, firms may avoid cutting wages for a wide variety of reasons. The 
survey allows us to document the relative importance of several possible reasons for 
avoiding wage cuts in the 14 European countries surveyed. Firm managers were asked 
to assess the relevance of the eight reasons listed in Section 2 for preventing base 
wage cuts. Answers were requested on a four-point scale: not relevant, of little 
relevance, relevant, and very relevant. Table 3 presents the percentages of firms in 
each country that ranked a given reason as very relevant or relevant, and Table 4 
shows the overall ranking of the different reasons.  
 
Looking first at the averages across all countries, the two most important reasons for 
avoiding base wage cuts are the belief that this would result in a reduction in morale 
or effort and the risk that the most productive workers would leave as a consequence. 
Both of these reasons were reported as relevant or very relevant by 86 percent of 
firms. The impact on employees’ morale is an explanation often found in the earlier 
literature (e.g. Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006; Kaufman, 1984; Campbell and Kamlani, 
1997; Bewley, 1998). The danger of the best employees leaving the firm is less 
commonly mentioned, but Campbell and Kamlani (1997) find strong support for the 
adverse selection model as applied to quits in the USA.  
 
A third prominent issue preventing nominal wage cuts in Europe comes from 
institutional restrictions, imposed either in the form of labour regulations or by 
collective agreements. The institutional reason was considered important by 74 
percent of firms. This reason was not considered in the studies analysing US data (i.e. 
Campbell and Kamlani, 1997, Bewley, 1998), although at least one study analysing 
European data finds some support for this reason in Germany (Franz and Pfeiffer, 
2006).  
 
12
  
At the opposite end of the scale, concerns about the firm’s reputation as an employer 
and the idea of implicit contracts that act as an insurance device had the lowest overall 
levels of support at 60 and 59 percent of firms, respectively. The remaining three 
reasons relating to future difficulty in recruitment, increased costs associated with 
employee turnover and employees making negative comparisons with outside wages 
were all rated as relevant by between 67 and 72 percent of firms. 
 
There was considerable dispersion across countries for some of the reasons examined, 
but the most relevant explanations were supported by the vast majority of managers in 
all countries. As such, there is no country where explanations relating to morale and 
losing productive staff were supported by interviewees representing less than 70 
percent of the labour force. In contrast, the importance of firm reputation and the 
existence of implicit contracts were generally more likely to be relevant for non-euro 
area countries than for euro area members. 
13
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Table 4. Reasons for avoiding base wage cuts – ranking of responses 
 
 Total Euro area 
Non-Euro 
area 
  Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank 
Most productive workers leave 0.86 1 0.85 3 0.90 1 
Lower worker morale/ less effort 0.86 2 0.87 1 0.82 2 
Labour regulations/ collective 
bargaining 
0.73 3 0.85 2 0.42 8 
Difficult to attract new workers 0.72 4 0.70 4 0.76 3 
Labour turnover costs increase 0.70 5 0.69 5 0.73 4 
External wages matter 0.68 6 0.69 6 0.66 6 
Reputation suffers 0.60 7 0.58 7 0.65 7 
Implicit contract 0.59 8 0.55 8 0.70 5 
Note: Share of firms which replied “very relevant” or “relevant” and the corresponding rank.  
 
 
The greatest variation was in the importance of labour regulations and collective 
bargaining, the relevance of which ranged from 36 percent of firms in Poland to 93 
percent of firms in Spain. The percentage of firms supporting the relevance of 
bargaining was almost twice as high in the euro area as in the non-euro area countries. 
This reflects substantial differences in the institutional structure of the wage-setting 
process across the European Union member states. As was indicated in Section 3.2, 
the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements tends to be much higher 
in euro area countries than in non-euro area countries. The difference stems mostly 
from the reach of collective agreements negotiated outside the firm at the sectoral or 
regional level (see Table 1). We will examine in more detail the effect of the type and 
intensity of collective bargaining agreements on firms’ perception of this as a reason 
for avoiding wage reductions in the next section. Table 4 presents the relative 
rankings of different reasons for the total sample and also separately for the euro area 
and non-euro area countries. 
 
The importance of each of these factors across sectors shows that effort and reputation 
are again consistently amongst the major inhibitors of wage reductions (Table 5). 
Regulation and collective agreements vary less in their relevance across sectors than 
they do across countries, although construction stands out as having a particularly low 
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percentage of firms classifying this reason as relevant, perhaps indicating the 
importance of informal labour relations in this sector and the high share of workers 
with temporary contracts, an issue to which we will return later. Concerns about 
losing the best staff are particularly marked in the financial sector and least relevant in 
non-market services. Firms in the non-market services sector also attach the lowest 
relevance to the cost of recruiting and training new staff. All these features are likely 
to be related to the types of worker that are employed in the sector, as we shall see 
later. However, firm characteristics also matter and firm size in particular is 
consistently associated with a larger probability of a firm reporting each reason as 
relevant or very relevant (Table 5), suggesting that larger firms with more complex 
organisational structures and perhaps employing a more diverse set of workers, 
experience more obstacles to wage cuts.  
 
Table 5 shows that firms attach a similar relevance to each of the reasons for avoiding 
wage cuts, independently of their collective bargaining coverage. There is a clear 
association between the relevance of the reason and higher bargaining coverage only 
in the case of labour regulation as an obstacle to wage cuts. Once collective 
bargaining is predominant in a firm, the bargaining level does not seem to make a 
large difference, whether it is internal, external or both. This suggests that the aspect 
of bargaining that matters for downward wage rigidity is union coverage, and not the 
precise institutional structure of the bargaining system.  
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Table 6 reports the correlations in relevance across the different explanations. In 
calculating the correlation coefficients we take into account the four different choices 
offered to the interviewees, exploiting the full variability in the survey questions. The 
relevance attached to regulation and collective agreements is very weakly correlated with 
the other explanations. The highest correlations are between the reasons relating to the 
difficulties firms may encounter in hiring new workers and the cost of hiring and training 
new workers. The relevance attached to concerns that the best employees may leave the 
firm and the reasons relating to the cost of hiring and training new workers and the 
difficulty in hiring new workers are also highly correlated.  
 
 
4. Firm Characteristics and Reasons for Avoiding Wage Cuts 
 
We now look at how firm characteristics are related to the relevance of each of the 
potential explanations for avoiding wage cuts. In contrast to our summary statistics above, 
we now exploit the full information in the data in a simple multivariate analysis. As the 
dependent variable for each reason is measured on a four-point relevance scale, we 
estimate ordered probit models for each of the questions separately. All of the 
specifications control for country and sector effects, which limits the impact that 
differences in the survey design across countries may have on the results.  
 
The regression results presented in Table 7 indicate that firms employing a higher 
proportion of blue-collar and low-skilled white-collar workers rank labour regulation 
highly. Franz and Pfeiffer (2006) also report that this reason appears to be more important 
for less skilled workers in Germany. This is probably because these workers are more 
likely to be covered by collective agreements than high-skilled white-collar workers. 
Importantly, such differences are not related to the sectoral composition of employment, a 
feature that is controlled for by the sector effects.  
 
The greater the proportion of low-skilled blue-collar workers in a firm, the less likely it is 
that concerns about losing skilled employees or the potential costs of later recruitment and 
training will be highly rated. This suggests that turnover explanations (cost of hiring and 
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training new workers) received stronger support among firms that use more high-skilled 
workers. In a similar vein, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) also report that turnover-related 
explanations are important for white-collar workers.  
 
It is interesting to note that the reason of a reduction in effort and morale does not vary 
across worker skill groups, while the efficiency wage theory would suggest that firms 
employing a higher share of high-skilled workers should be more concerned about their 
employees exerting less effort, as the effort of high-skilled workers is more difficult to 
monitor. However, the relationship between worker skills, effort and downward wage 
rigidity is not straightforward. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) actually report that firms 
generally consider that a wage cut would have a stronger impact on the effort of low-
skilled workers. Their interpretation is that high-skilled workers are motivated by the 
challenges entailed by their job and not purely incentivised by the wage itself. 
Interestingly, hiring difficulty is significantly higher in firms that mostly employ high-
skilled blue-collar workers, perhaps due to a higher degree of firm-specific skills amongst 
this group. The higher relevance of the versions of the efficiency wage theory related to 
quits, hiring difficulty and hiring and training costs in firms that employ a higher 
proportion of skilled workers may be related to the firms’ production structure. In recent 
years, skilled-biased technical progress has increased the relative demand for skilled 
workforce. 
 
Interesting patterns emerge between the different explanations for downward wage 
rigidity and the type of contracts that are prevalent at the firm level. In particular, firms 
employing a larger share of their workforce under temporary contracts are more likely to 
avoid wage cuts because they may earn the firm a bad reputation as an employer, the best 
employees may leave, and there is a perceived difficulty in hiring new workers. All of 
these factors imply that firms hiring temporary workers are conscious of the need to 
recruit staff regularly. Firms that employ a higher proportion of workers with fixed-term 
contracts also rank highly the fact that employees may compare wages to outside 
opportunities, implying that the contract nature of these jobs makes the worker more likely 
to be aware of outside options.  
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Larger firms tend to assign more relevance to a number of explanations for avoiding wage 
cuts, in particular to labour regulation, their reputation as an employer, the danger of the 
best employees leaving the firm, the potential difficulties in hiring new workers and the 
cost of hiring and training new workers. Somewhat unexpectedly though, larger firms do 
not seem to assign particular relevance to effort. It could be argued that bigger firms 
would worry more about the impact of a wage cut on effort due to higher monitoring 
difficulties. Our finding is in contrast to that of Agell and Bennmarker (2007) for Sweden, 
who report that managers in bigger firms tend to note that they find difficulties in 
appraising work performance and are thus more likely to pay efficiency wages.  
 
Again in contrast to the findings of Agell and Bennmarker (2007), firm size does not seem 
to be related to differences in the importance attributed to employees comparing wages, 
while smaller firms seem to assign higher relevance to insurance motives in which firms 
agree implicitly with workers that wages should be relatively insulated from economic 
shocks. Modern contract theory has suggested that an obstacle to insurance provision from 
the side of firms is that effort is hard to observe (see e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). 
This is less likely to be the case in smaller firms. In addition, managers and employees in 
smaller firms interact more closely and have personal relationships that provide a useful 
ground for the establishment of implicit contracts. 
 
Another interesting relationship that our data allow us to investigate and that has not been 
identified in previous studies is the one between the intensity of product market 
competition and the various explanations for avoiding wage cuts. We might expect firms 
experiencing severe competition to be more conscious of human resource policies in 
general and therefore to be more aware of the constraints that prevent them from cutting 
wages. We use a measure of competition that is a self-perceived indicator of the intensity 
of competition where firms were asked to report whether they face severe, strong, or weak 
or no competition. We add this measure of competition as an additional control variable to 
the set of variables included in the regression specification that was presented in Table 7. 
This control variable was not included in the first set of regressions because its inclusion 
reduces the number of observations used in the regression as the question was not covered 
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by all countries’ questionnaires.10 Table 8 shows that there is a significant positive 
association between the intensity of perceived competition and the relevance of all 
theories. In most cases the association monotonically increases with the perceived 
intensity of competition. Firms facing weak or no competition are significantly less likely 
to report that the various theories suggested are preventing them from reducing wages than 
are firms that face severe competition.  
 
As previous papers used data from single countries, they were limited in their ability to 
examine the importance of institutional factors for downward wage rigidity as perceived 
by company managers. The detailed data used here are the first to fill this gap. Table 9 
combines a number of additional specifications to examine how wage bargaining 
arrangements and some other firm characteristics affect the relevance ranking of the 
different theories. Each specification continues to include as additional controls all the 
variables that were used in the regressions presented in Table 8, but these are suppressed 
for presentational reasons.  
 
Not surprisingly, Panel A in Table 9 shows a strong positive association between union 
coverage and the relevance of labour regulation as a reason for avoiding wage cuts. More 
interestingly, collective bargaining is positively associated with long-term relationships 
between workers and firms through implicit contracts that insulate wages from outside 
conditions. There is also a strong positive association between the coverage of union 
contracts and the importance of reputation. The correlation with collective bargaining 
coverage is negative for the reason referring to the fact that the best employees may leave.  
                                                 
10 Austria, Belgium, Spain and Italy did not include this question. 
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When we evaluate different institutional wage-bargaining designs separately we find that 
firms with any type of collective agreement tend to rank labour regulation highly as a 
reason for avoiding wage cuts (Panel B). Thus when it comes to ranking labour regulation, 
there are no significant differences between having agreements at the firm level or at 
higher levels. Instead, managers of firms covered by union contracts signed outside the 
firm give a higher rank to reduced effort and morale, reputation and implicit contracts. 
This result contrasts with the answers from managers of firms that negotiate with unions at 
the firm level, as these show no differences from managers that negotiate with workers 
individually. This is an indication of the role of centralised forms of bargaining in 
facilitating information about workers rights and working conditions in different firms. It 
appears though that the information dissemination property of centralised forms of 
bargaining is only present in countries where centralised bargaining is dominant. Indeed, 
Table 10 shows that firms in the euro area covered by agreements signed outside the firm 
rank reduced effort and morale, reputation and implicit contracts highly. On the other 
hand, in the non-euro area countries where centralised and sectoral bargaining is rarer, the 
coverage by outside agreements does not seem to influence firms’ responses to the 
different questions. 
 
Managers in firms that feature firm-level collective agreements attribute less importance 
to the danger that the best employees may leave if wages are cut. Since collective 
bargaining and wage determination issues at the firm level are bound to be tailored to the 
specific characteristics of each firm, managers in this type of bargaining framework 
appear to be less concerned about adverse selection if it eventually becomes necessary to 
cut wages. This may indicate that there is an important wage premium associated with 
firm-level collective bargaining, which could discourage workers from searching for other 
offers even in the event of a nominal wage cut. 
 
We also look at the relationship between firms’ worker turnover and the view of their 
managers about the reasons for avoiding wage cuts. Firms were asked to report the 
percentage of employees joining and leaving the firm during the last year. Using this 
information and the number of employees reported by the firm we built a measure of 
worker turnover that is included in the regressions reported in Panel C of Table 9. The 
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regression shows that firms featuring higher turnover rates show more support to 
practically all the reasons for avoiding wage cuts. The estimated impacts are of particular 
importance with the fear of best employees leaving the firm, reputational hazards, and the 
difficulty of hiring employees in the future. Hence firms operating in more unstable 
environments appear to be more conscious of the negative consequences of cutting wages 
on maintaining a high quality workforce.  
 
The final question that we pose is whether firms that have had actual experience of 
reducing wages have a different view of the reasons for avoiding cuts than firms that have 
never done so. The last panel of Table 9 shows that firms that have cut wages during the 
five years preceding the survey fairly consistently attach less relevance to each of the 
obstacles than do firms that have not done so. This can be interpreted as an internal 
consistency check of the perceptions of the managers surveyed: firms that have cut wages 
have probably done so because they did not assign much relevance to the stated reasons. 
However, it could also be that the past experience of managers who went through wage 
cuts leads them to believe that if employees can be persuaded that the cut is justified, 
perhaps because it will preserve jobs, the usual obstacles can be overcome. However, as 
we noted at the start of the paper, the number of firms that had implemented wage cuts at 
the time of the survey was very small, so a degree of caution is necessary in drawing 
conclusions from this specification. 
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Our results are based on data collected prior to the economic downturn experienced by 
European countries in recent years. However, research using data covering periods of 
recessions also shows that wages are very rarely cut (Agell and Lundborg, 2003). Messina 
and Rõõm (2012) use data from a survey that covers the recent downturn for a sub-sample 
of the firms surveyed here and also show that wage cuts were rather rare. They find that 
broadly the same ranking of theoretical reasons for wage rigidity still holds, which 
suggests that the managers’ views of the reasons for avoiding wage cuts are not strongly 
affected by the business cycle.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In light of the rarity of wage cuts, even in the face of quite severe economic shocks, this 
paper examines firm-level responses ranking the relevance of each of a number of theories 
put forward in the labour economics literature for why cuts tend to be avoided. To do this, 
we use a fairly large specially commissioned survey of firms across fourteen European 
countries asking managers directly about their experiences with wage cuts. 
 
Just over two percent of firms had cut wages over the last five years at the time of the 
survey. We document the relative importance of eight possible reasons for avoiding wage 
cuts, with firms being asked about the effect of labour regulations and collective 
agreements, the existence of implicit contracts, efficiency wage considerations in terms of 
negative effects on worker morale or effort, whether firms had concerns about losing key 
staff or causing difficulties in future recruitment, whether the costs of future recruitment 
and training would be higher, and whether they felt employees would be concerned with 
how their wage compares to that of similar workers in other firms. 
 
Across all countries and sectors, the two most important causes for avoiding base wage 
cuts are the belief that this would result in a reduction in morale or effort and the danger 
that the most productive workers would leave as a consequence. The greatest variation 
across countries was in the importance attached to labour regulations and collective 
bargaining, which we found to be almost twice as high in the euro area countries as in the 
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non-euro area countries. When we investigated the relevance of this institutional factor 
within countries further, we found that firms covered by collective agreements, regardless 
of whether those had been negotiated at the firm level or at a more centralised level, were 
the most likely to rank labour regulations and bargaining institutions as a prominent 
reason for avoiding reductions in nominal pay. 
 
We find certain firm characteristics to be strongly related to the relevance of different 
theories. For example, firms that employ higher proportions of blue-collar and low-skilled 
white-collar workers rank labour regulation highly but are less likely to lay importance on 
concerns about losing the best employees, or the potential costs of later recruitment and 
training. Larger firms are more likely to be aware of the potential complications associated 
with reductions in nominal pay and to assign higher relevance to most of the possible 
reasons for avoiding wage cuts. Fears about lower effort and lower morale are 
systematically quoted as highly relevant reasons for avoiding wage cuts across firms of 
any type. 
 
Despite the high degree of relevance that firms in the survey attached to each of the 
explanations for avoiding wage cuts, the small group of firms with previous experience of 
having actually cut wages indicated a much lower relevance score for most categories. 
This is an issue that deserves further research as it may indicate that in certain 
circumstances, for example if employees can be persuaded that the cut will preserve jobs, 
firms find a way to overcome the usual obstacles to cutting workers’ pay.   
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